yes that is why i mentioned 61.153 but as long as their training program matches ICAO standards then the transfer is fairly seamless and easy. But that is only to allow a transfer of licenses, most international pilots who fly into the hubs/bases with their own flag carriers do not require any sort of transfer hence my point about Ethiopian flying into ATL, IAD, LAX etc. but again that is getting way deep in the weeds and distracting from the point of the thread; the MAX
well that is not quite true and oversimplifies the accident. both the NTSB and the Ethiopian ministry of transport reports about the accident list that the cutout switches had been pressed
Cockpit voice recorder data indicated that the flight crew then discussed the STAB
TRIM CUTOUT switches, and shortly thereafter DFDR data were consistent with the STAB TRIM
CUTOUT switches being moved to CUTOUT
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/ASR1901.pdf
agreed for the most part. its the same switch location but they did change the name marking on those switches and the functionality (MAIN ELEC and AUTOPILOT to PRI B/U)
On the newer 737 MAX, according to documents reviewed by The Times, those two switches were changed to perform the same function – flipping either one of them would turn off all electric controls of the stabilizer. That means there is no longer an option to turn off automated functions – such as MCAS – without also turning off the thumb buttons the pilots would normally use to control the stabilizer.
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-altered-key-switches-in-737-max-cockpit-limiting-ability-to-shut-off-mcas/
those are the part of the 7 steps memory item we all had to memorize. but that memory item, while simple, isnt done in a single 5sec flow like say the unreliable airspeed one. this is for the people who are not familiar with it; its set up as a checklist where you take each step and analyze whether that fixed the runway then you take the next step. (this is the one we used, STODR your operator may have slightly different wording or sequence)
- Control Column - Hold Firmly
- Autopilot (if engaged) - Disengage
- Autothrottle (if engaged) - Disengage
- Control Column and Thrust Levers - Control aircraft pitch attitude and airspeed
- Main Electric Stabilizer Trim - Reduce control column forces
- IF the runway STOPS after autopilot is disengaged - DO NOT re-engage autopilot or autothrottle
- If the runaway continues after the autopilot is disengaged -
A. STAB TRIM cutout switches (both) - CUTOUT
B. If the runaway continues -
a. Stabilizer Trim Wheel - Grasp & Hold
MCAS turns on only when the AP is disconnected.(which you see in step 2) and that is the fatal mistake that Boeing did not tell the airline who bought the plane or the pilots who flew the aircraft. More importantly it would reset and reactivate every 5 seconds if the pilot used more stab switch imput. (this was actually changed when the max was ungrounded to a single nose down activation per high AOA state)
The other fixe that was which would have greatly helped the crew SA would have been seeing AOA DISAGREE message on PFD which was not a standard option unless you paid extra…now that is not the case anymore
and this goes back to Boeing many failure during the entire max both with the crashes and the door plug, the anti ice issue , the wiring, the rudder bolt. and why its indefensible. The culture that has developed to maximize shareholder value at any cost is now bearing those fruits.
For the portion of the examination focused on Boeing, the F.A.A. conducted 89 product audits, a type of review that looks at aspects of the production process. The plane maker passed 56 of the audits and failed 33 of them, with a total of 97 instances of alleged noncompliance,
i mean for ■■■■ sake…
In another instance, the F.A.A. saw Spirit mechanics apply liquid Dawn soap to a door seal “as lubricant in the fit-up process,” according to the document. The door seal was then cleaned with a wet cheesecloth, the document said, noting that instructions were “vague and unclear on what specifications/actions are to be followed or recorded by the mechanic.”