The EU does have more of a weapons production ability than a lot of people think.
Grok to the rescue for a comprehensive and balanced answer.
The European Union (EU) does make its own weapons, boasting a significant domestic defense industry that produces a wide range of military equipment, from small arms to advanced systems like fighter jets, tanks, and naval vessels. The EU’s 27 member states collectively host thousands of companies involved in weapons and ammunition manufacturing, with countries like Germany, France, and Italy leading the charge.
In 2020, Germany had 221 weapons and ammunition manufacturers, Italy had 157, and France had 122, contributing to a total of 1,804 such businesses across the EU-27. The market size of this industry was estimated at €23.6 billion in 2025, reflecting a robust—if somewhat fragmented—production capacity. Major players include companies like Airbus (multinational, with strong EU roots), Thales (France), Leonardo (Italy), and Rheinmetall (Germany), which produce everything from Eurofighter Typhoon jets and Leclerc tanks to artillery systems and missile technology like the MBDA’s Meteor air-to-air missile.
The EU’s domestic production covers a broad spectrum. For instance, France’s Nexter (now part of KNDS) manufactures the CAESAR self-propelled howitzer, widely used and exported, while Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann produces the Leopard 2 tank, a global benchmark. The EU also has initiatives to ramp up ammunition production, such as the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which allocated €500 million to boost output of 155mm artillery shells—capacity that grew from 300,000 rounds annually in early 2023 to 600,000–700,000 by late 2023, with a target of 1 million in 2024.
Despite this, the EU’s production isn’t fully self-sufficient. Intra-EU trade is limited, with only about 20% of defense purchases since 2022 coming from EU providers, and some “domestic” firms are subsidiaries of non-EU (often U.S.) companies. The European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the €1.5 billion European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) for 2025–2027 aim to strengthen this capacity, addressing gaps exposed by recent demand spikes, particularly for Ukraine. Historically, military equipment spending in the EU has favored domestic producers, with imports typically under 10% of total expenditure in key countries, showing a strong “home bias.”
So, yes, the EU makes its own weapons—and a lot of them—but it still relies on imports, especially from the U.S., for certain advanced systems or urgent needs, while working to bolster its autonomy.
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