Supreme Court hands down an important ruling under the Takings Clause today (4/12/24)

Link to the Opinion of the Court.

Case is Sheetz v County of El Dorado, California.

BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which JACKSON, J., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.

As a condition of receiving a residential building permit, petitioner George Sheetz was required by the County of El Dorado to pay a $23,420 traffic impact fee. The fee was part of a “General Plan” enacted by the County’s Board of Supervisors to address increasing demand for public services spurred by new development. The fee amount was not based on the costs of traffic impacts specifically attributable to Sheetz’s particular project, but rather was assessed according to a rate schedule that took into account the type of development and its location within the County. Sheetz paid the fee under protest and obtained the permit. He later sought relief in state court, claiming that conditioning the building permit on the payment of a traffic impact fee constituted an unlawful “exaction” of money in violation of the Takings Clause. In Sheetz’s view, the Court’s decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825, and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, required the County to make an individualized determination that the fee imposed on him was necessary to offset traffic congestion attributable to his project. The courts below ruled against Sheetz based on their view that Nollan and Dolan apply only to permit conditions imposed on an ad hoc basis by administrators, not to a fee like this one imposed on a class of property owners by Board-enacted legislation. 84 Cal. App. 5th 394, 402, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, 312.

Held: The Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions. Pp. 4–11.

(a) When the government wants to take private property for a public purpose, the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause requires the government to provide the owner “just compensation.” The Takings Clause saves individual property owners from bearing “public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49. Even so, the States have substantial authority to regulate land use, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, and a State law that merely restricts land use in a way “reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose” is not a taking unless it saps too much of the property’s value or frustrates the owner’s investment backed expectations. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 123, 127. Similarly, when the government can deny a building permit to further a “legitimate police-power purpose,” it can also place conditions on the permit that serve the same end. Nollan, 483 U. S., at 836. For example, if a proposed development will “substantially increase traffic congestion,” the government may condition the building permit on the owner’s willingness “to deed over the land needed to widen a public road.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 570 U. S. 595, 605. But when the government withholds or conditions a building permit for reasons unrelated to its legitimate land-use interests, those actions amount to extortion. See Nollan, 483 U. S., at 837. The Court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan address the potential abuse of the permitting process by setting out a two-part test modeled on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597. First, permit conditions must have an “essential nexus” to the government’s land-use interest, ensuring that the government is acting to further its stated purpose, not leveraging its permitting monopoly to exact private property without paying for it. See Nollan, 483 U. S., at 837, 841. Second, permit conditions must have “rough proportionality” to the development’s impact on the land-use interest and may not require a landowner to give up (or pay) more than is necessary to mitigate harms resulting from new development. See Dolan, 512 U. S., at 391, 393; Koontz, 570 U. S., at 612–615. Pp. 4–6.

(b) The County’s traffic impact fee was upheld below based on the view that the Nollan/Dolan test does not apply to monetary fees imposed by a legislature, but nothing in constitutional text, history, or precedent supports exempting legislatures from ordinary takings rules. The Constitution provides “no textual justification for saying that the existence or the scope of a State’s power to expropriate private property without just compensation varies according to the branch of government effecting the expropriation.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U. S. 702, 714 (plurality opinion). Historical practice similarly shows that legislation was the conventional way that governments at the state and national levels exercised their eminent domain power to obtain land for various governmental purposes, and to provide compensation to dispossessed landowners. The Fifth Amendment enshrined this long standing practice. Precedent points the same way as text and history. A legislative exception to the Nollan/Dolan test “conflicts with the rest of [the Court’s] takings jurisprudence,” which does not otherwise distinguish between legislation and other official acts. Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 185. That is true of precedents involving physical takings, regulatory takings, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine which underlies the Nollan/Dolan test. Pp. 7–10.

(c) As the parties now agree, conditions on building permits are not exempt from scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan just because a legislative body imposed them. Whether a permit condition imposed on a class of properties must be tailored with the same degree of specificity as a permit condition that targets a particular development is an issue for the state courts to consider in the first instance, as are issues concerning whether the parties’ other arguments are preserved and how those arguments bear on Sheetz’s legal challenge.

Pp. 10–11. 84 Cal. App. 5th 394, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, vacated and remanded.

Glad to see this abusive practice ended.

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Can I get a tl;dr, please?

The fact that a fee is authorized by a legislature does not make it exempt from the Takings Clause, if it is an excessive amount.

Thanks, man! My understanding of legalese can be limited.

Here is a plain English analysis at Scotusblog.

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“Unanimous Ruling” Outstanding!

But I wonder how much it cost him to win the case. Far more than the $24,000 fee I would guess.

This is a great example of why a winner in court ought to get compensation from the loser for legal and other fees. Summarily, and not requiring a separate civil suit.

That’s how it is in most common-law countries. There’s a reason why people call not being automatically awarded attorney’s fees the “American Rule.”

The US should definitely be more like those countries.

There are some exceptions.

I won attorney’s fees and court costs in a dispute with Allstate (one of their insured collided with my parked car). They tried to play their usual ■■■■■■■■ to lowball and I took them straight to court. The Judge was having none of the ■■■■ they were trying to spew and awarded me the full demanded amount, plus my attorney’s fees and court costs, finding their behavior malicious.

Depends on the State and nature of the dispute and sometimes the nature of the defendant.

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