This was the first flight on a Max for both pilots. Unfamiliarity with flight deck displays led to confusion about display annunciations and switch function. The Flight Manual does not address at least one annunciation, or the controls for the display—or if it does, neither pilot could find the explanation. I have spent literally days looking for an explanation, could not find one, and that is why I wrote this report. It shouldn’t be this hard to figure out what I’m looking at.
James Fallows makes a flawed statement about 1979 DC 10. He states: “and for the DC-10, after an investigation found that the crash was not caused by any basic design flaws”.
This is patently flawed. That the engine fell off it is true that the basic design flaws were not a part of that. However, the fact that there was no control of the plane after it happened was a huge design flaw. At the time McDonnel Douglas was competing, and playing catch up to Boeing in the 747 race for a wide body jumbo jet. They were behind the 747. The DC 10 cut corners on laying out a separate pathway for hydraulic redundancy systems. Those lines on a 747 are set up to be on the front and back edged of the wing. The Hydraulic lines on the DC 10 were set up to be on top of each other. The main line on the bottom and the redundant line on the top of the leading edge of the wing. This is also where the engine pylon attached to the wing. Had there been front and back redundancy, there would have been control of all the hydraulic systems. This would have given the pilots control of the plane and given them a fighting chance. With the top to bottom hydraulic lines, the pilots had no control. I think the last word uttered was ■■■■■
The main cause of the accident was that American Airlines did not follow safety guidelines in their routine maintenance checks of DC 10 engines. The Engines were to be removed by putting them in a strapped harness and lowering the unit to the ground to check for wear and tear. This kept the unit in place while removing it from the wing pylon. American utilized fork lifts to do this without any supporting harnesses to keep the engine affixed and in a safe position until the flange bolts were removed and the engine could be safely removed. What they found is that when the forks were placed under the wings, the forklift would be shut off. While it was off some hydraulic pressure bled off causing the fork lift to drop ever so slightly. This over time and the life of the pylon and engine mounts put undue pressure on the front edge flange bolt causing a hairline crack in the pylon mount. This crack over time and miles and miles of flight time, grew bigger until such time that the flange cracked causing the front of the engine to break loose and it was only a matter of time that the whole engine broke loose taking all the hydraulic controls with it.
So the statement is partially correct only. The FAA blamed it on human error and design flaw. I spent hours as a high school kid pouring over pages and pages of FAA reports, investigative reports, law suits and the like doing a research paper for my Honors English class in high school. It was only a few years removed from the crash so there was a boatload of information. Never flew a DC 10 after that.
It goes to show you that even the simplest of things, Forward and rear hydraulic lines, using proper service techniques and things like that can make the difference between life and death.
If they the instrumentation is not the same or even close to similar, it can’t be said to be similar. These guys are used to seeing things in the same place no matter what. If I am flying a 737-800 and get into a MAX and nothing is the same on the Instrumentation on the flight deck (because you can’t say cockpit). Then in the situation of making split second decisions…you are already behind the 8 ball.
Hey Conan! I found all the hiding liberals and moderate Democrats! They’re all in this thread, giving credit where credit is due. We should all try that - what do you think?
I give Trump credit…LOL when there are millions of dollars involved…corporate America doesn’t always do the right thing. Trump stepped up and did the right thing before it got out of hand. It is the right call.
Yep nothing screws me up more for a few minutes. Also when the ■■■■ hits the fan you fall back on old habits. I will ask my bodies who fly it if the instrumentation is different.
I don’t fly. But I manage peoples lives for a living…and when the ■■■■ hits the fan, All eyes turn to me, and if my playbook falters or I don’t do things the way I think I should or someone convinces me to act in a way that I don’t want to…I usually end up and ■■■■ a brick. This is why my contingency planning has me constantly running through what if scenarios in my head. “and what if this happens and what if that happens”? How would I react to this? or Than?
I work with Autistic people, who live in their own homes in the community. Four years ago, on Christmas Eve day one of my guys got his hands on a lighter and burned is bedroom up. I, on Christmas day had to decide what to do where to relocate them, get a recovery company out to board things up, notify families, write incident reports, notify the State and then tell my staff where to go and what to do. It was a mess. But because I ran this in my head several times, it was a matter of 15 minutes and I had things handled. When I called our executive director to notify him he started telling me what to do, and I simply said. yep…did that, yep covered that, yep here’s where they are staying temporarily. He was like well what do you need me for. I told him with a laugh, I didn’t I just wanted to let you know it’s all handled. He wished me a Merry Christmas, and we met up two days later to discuss where to go from there.
My point is this. You have contingency’s and fail safe’s for a reason. If you can 't get to them readily, or access the things you need to do like you normally would. You are doomed from the start.
I have not read any. Only seen reports from people who said somebody said it. So waiting on my buddies who fly them to let me know. Here is another article
I think this entire setup needs to be thoroughly explained to pilots. How can a Captain not know what switch is meant during a preflight setup? Poor training and even poorer documentation, that is how.
It is not reassuring when a light cannot be explained or understood by the pilots, even after referencing their flight manuals. It is especially concerning when every other MAINT annunciation means something bad. I envision some delayed departures as conscientious pilots try to resolve the meaning of the MAINT annunciation and which switches are referred to in the setup.
and
ACN: 1555013
My post flight evaluation is that we lacked the knowledge to operate the aircraft in all weather and aircraft states safely. The instrumentation is completely different - My scan was degraded, slow and labored having had no experience w/ the new ND (Navigation Display) and ADI (Attitude Director Indicator) presentations/format or functions (manipulation between the screens and systems pages were not provided in training materials. If they were, I had no recollection of that material).
Top one from Max and bottom from NG, so in my opinion enough differences to be annoying and possibly dangerous. Boeing says the things are in same place but put onto larger displays so fewer displays overall. Not sure I buy that
In response to this I did a bit of on-line searching and found this explanation from Scientific America. You are right and wrong. The engines are mounted below the COG which tends to rotate the nose upward when the wings begin lose lift. The MCAS, which is only active while the plane is being flown manually, automatically adjusts the trim to hold the nose down so that the pilot doesn’t have to push the yoke forward to correct that condition.
It may not be drastically different, but different enough, even a switch configuration that is different from what they are using in an 800 would be cause for alarm if I have never flown one before. I have driven cars since I was 17. I haven’t forgotten how to fly, but when I step out of my 2009 Dodge Caravan into my moms 2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee with all the bells and whistles…I get overwhelmed to say the least. Even the cruise control is configured differently on the steering column and wheel that is makes it confusing for me to use without staring and reading what button is for what.
That is inexcusable. The flight deck of the Max 8 and 9 is significantly different than on the model 800. That would be terrifying for a pilot regardless of the apparent MCAS issue.
